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NOTES AND COMMENT
prima facie evidence of his refusal or neglect to provide for his wife. 25
It is now well established that the burden of proving abandon-
ment rests upon the party alleging it.26
The legislative policy of barring a spouse from an elective share
where there was an abandonment or a neglect or refusal to provide
was not incorporated in the general revision of the Decedent Estate
Law in regard to a share passing to the surviving spouse by intes-
tacy.27 By subsequent amendment a surviving spouse is barred upon
similar grounds from receiving an intestate share.28  This policy has
been further extended to dowager for wrongful death 29 and to the
statutory cash and property exemptions granted a husband and wife
under the provisions of the Surrogate's Court Act.30
JAMES J. THORNTON.
MALPRACTICE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I
Ironical as it seems, the New York State Legislature in its
efforts clearly to define the rights and remedies of citizens of the
state has at times enacted statutes which, in their ambiguity, con-
found bench and bar alike. Courts, reluctant to go beyond a literal
interpretation of these statutes, have often placed upon them harsh
and unfair constructions which remain long unchallenged because of
a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. The inevitable re-
sult is an unending list of unjust decisions. This has been the case
25 Matter of Rechtschaffen, 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357 (1938).
26 Matter of Maiden, 284 N. Y. 429, 31 N. E. (2d) 889 (1940); Matter
of Rechtschaffen, 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357 (1938) ; Matter of Quick,
262 App. Div. 808, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (4th Dep't 1941).
27 Matter of Knuppel, 151 Misc. 773, 273 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1933).
2 8 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 87, subd. c and d providing:
"No distributive share of the estate of a decedent shall be allowed under
the provisions of this article, either
(c) to a husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or has abandoned her;
(d) or to a wife who has abandoned her husband."2 9 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 133, subd. 4a and b providing:
"No distributive share of such damages shall be allowed under the pro-
visions of this article either
(a) To a husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or has abandoned her;
(b) Or to a wife who has abandoned her husband."
30 N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 200, subd. 6, providing: "No property or money
shall be set apart under this section to a surviving spouse who cannot inherit
as a distributee, any part of the estate of a deceased spouse who died intestate;
nor to a surviving spouse who can neither inherit, nor claim any rights against
the estate of a deceased spouse who has died testate."
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with Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act,1 which sets forth the limi-
tation period applicable in malpractice actions.
A physician and surgeon or other person practicing a profession
similar thereto, by taking charge of a case, impliedly represents that
he possesses, and the law places upon him the duty of possessing, that
reasonable degree of learning and skill that is ordinarily possessed by
others of his profession in the locality where he practices.2  He rep-
resents that he has that ability which is regarded by those conversant
with the employment as necessary to qualify him to engage in such
profession.3 He is under the further obligation to use his best judg-
ment in exercising his skill and applying his knowledge.4 The law,
therefore, holds him liable for an injury to his patient resulting from
a want of the requisite knowledge and skill, or the omission to exer-
cise reasonable care, or the failure to use his best judgment.5
Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act states: "An action to re-
cover damages for * * * malpractice must be commenced within two
years after the cause of action has accrued." In Conklin v. Draper 6
defendant physician having operated upon the plaintiff for appendi-
citis left a pair of arterial forceps, which had been used during the
course of the operation, within plaintiff's abdominal cavity. Plaintiff
recovered from the appendicitis operation but continued to suffer in-
testinal attacks. She consulted her regular physician but was assured
that the operation performed by defendant was successful and that
her ill health was due to some other cause. It was not until several
years after the operation that the presence of the forceps was dis-
covered and removed. Plaintiff began her malpractice action within
two years after her discovery of the fact that the forceps had been
left in her body but more than four years after the operation was
performed. It is important to note that Section 50 does not say
whether the two-year period prescribed therein begins to run from
the time plaintiff learns of the injury or from the time of the mal-
practice. Promptness of action presupposes the knowledge of the
existence of conditions which warrant such action and it is unreason-
able to expect a person to bring suit for malpractice until he has ac-
tual knowledge of the facts which constitute the wrong.7 It would
seem, therefore, that the limitation period should run from the date
I N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 50. "Actions to be commenced within two years.
The following actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of
action has accrued:
"1. An action to recover damages for *** malpractice."
2 2 CARMODY, N. Y. PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1930) 702.
3 Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 201, 209, 49 N. E. 760, 762 (1898).
- Ibid.
5 2 CARMODY, N. Y. PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1930) 702.
6 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y.
620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930).
7 BROTHERS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1925) 254, 255; OPPEN-
HEIMER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1935) 113.
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of discovery of the injury.8 Our courts, however, failing to find an
explicit provision to this effect within the statute thought themselves
constrained to hold that the cause of action accrued at the date of per-
petration of the malpractice. 9 Conklin v. Draper was decided ac-
cordingly and the suit was barred. We have then a situation where
plaintiff can bring an action for malpractice only if he has been for-
tunate enough to discover the wrong within two years after its com-
mission. Even though a failure to become aware of the injury to his
person within this period of time is not due to any lack of diligence
on his part, the action is nevertheless barred and plaintiff left without
a satisfactory means of redress.
If the broad statements to the effect that under Section 50,
the period of limitation begins to run at the time of the negligent
act are given their full effect, it would appear that there is nothing to
be considered except the particular time when the specific treatment
or operation was performed. Yet it was decided in Sly v. Van
Lengen 10 that the statute does not start to run until the relation of
physician and patient terminates. This novel theory was disapproved
in later cases, then reaffirmed by the same court, divided each time.11
The doctrine has been rejected elsewhere 12 and is indeed, difficult to
support.'3 In all these malpractice actions, the cause of action upon
which the statute starts to run is founded upon a breach of duty, and
not upon the fact that some damage has occurred as a consequence
of a prior breach. 14
s ote (1938) 12 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 330.
9 Wetzel v. Pius, 28 Cal. App. 104, 248 Pac. 288 (1926) ; Ogg v. Robb, 181
Iowa 145, 162 N. W. 217 (1917) ; Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E.
653 (1929) ; Ranalli v. Breed, 277 N. Y. 630, 14 N. E. (2d) 195 (1938) ;
Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926);
Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1918);
Barnes v. Gardner, 170 Misc. 604, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 785 (1939); Bodne v.
Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2 S. W. (2d) 104 (1928).
20 120 Misc. 420, 198 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1923) (The decision was based on
Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865 (1902), where the court, in
holding that the period of limitation for an action based upon defendant's
leaving a sponge in the abdominal incision would not commence with the date
of the closing of the incision, made the following statement: "The facts in the
case at bar show a continuous obligation upon the plaintiff in error so long as
the relation or employment continued, and each day's failure to remove the
sponge was a fresh breach of contract implied. The removal of the sponge
was part of the operation, and in this respect the surgeon left the operation
incompleted.').
"Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N. E. 238 (1919) ; McArthur v.
Bowers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N. E. 1128 (1905).
12 Duff v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 189 Fed. 234 (C. C. A. Ohio 1911).
13 (1923) 37 HARV. L. Rlv. 272.
14 Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. 172 (U. S. 1830); Fronce v. Nichols, 12
0. C. D. 472; see 2 WooD, LIMITATIONS (4th ed.) §§ 177, 178.
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Attempts to Circumvent Section 50
(a) The second count in the complaint in the Conklin case con-
tained nothing but contractual allegations without reference to pain
and suffering and was held to be subject to the six-year period of
limitations prescribed for contract actions.' 5 This was an important
break from the majority rule, namely, that the limitation period pre-
scribed for actions against physicians, surgeons and dentists for mal-
practice or negligence causing personal injuries applied to an action
for any of such causes notwithstanding the fact that the complaint
therein was in form an action on contract.' 6 Some jurisdictions had
attempted to get away from this rule.' 7 In accord with the Conklin
case, it was held by a New York court in Keating v. Perkins '8 that
where the action purports to be for breach of contract, the limitation
period applicable to contract actions should govern. If plaintiff now
wishes to avoid a short period of limitations he may base his claim
on contract instead of malpractice. In a contract action, however, no
recovery can be had for the wrong involving unskillful treatment
and for the pain and suffering occasioned thereby but only for sums
expended for medical attention, or other damages that flow naturally
from the breach of whatever contract was made between the parties.' 9
Obviously, this would be an entirely unsatisfactory remedy affording
plaintiff only partial relief.
(b) Another means of evading the two-year period prescribed
in Section 50 was attempted in Tulloch v. Haselo.20 The complaint
alleged that by reason of the negligence of defendant, a duly licensed
dentist, one of plaintiff's extracted teeth went down her throat and
lodged in her lung; that defendant fraudulently concealed this fact
from plaintiff, and that she did not know of it until the tooth was
removed from her lung three years later. Plaintiff contended that
the action was for fraud and that under Section 48 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act,21 the cause of action was deemed to accrue at the date of
15 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 48. "Actions to be commenced within six years
after the cause of action has accrued:
"I. An action to recover upon a liability created by statute, except a
judgment or sealed instrument."
'6 Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. 424 (1872); Burrell v. Preston, 54 Hun 70
N. Y. 1889); Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N. Y. Supp. 881
1st Dep't 1926); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N. Y. Supp. 15(2d Dep't 1918); Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N. Y. Supp. 994(1916) ; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865 (1902); Bodne v.
Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2 S. W. (2d) 100 (1928).
'7 Palmer v. Jackson, 62 Fla. 249, 57 So. 240 (1911); Burns v. Barenfield,
84 Ind. 43 (1882) ; Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159, 15 Am. Rep. 285 (1874).Is 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937).
1' 2 CARMODY, N. Y. PRACrIcE (Perm. ed. 1930) 704.
20218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926).21 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48. "An action to procure a judgment on the
ground of fraud. The cause of action in such a case is not deemed to have
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discovery of the fraud. The court nevertheless held that the action
was one for malpractice and that the two-year statute, running from
the date of perpetration of the injury, applied. The opinion states
that the proximate cause of the damage was defendant's negligence in
permitting the tooth to fall down plaintiff's throat, and that the con-
cealment of the act merely aggravated the original wrong and was
not the gravamen of an action to procure a judgment on the ground
of fraud within Section 4822 Malpractice was the proximate cause
of the injury; the relation of dentist and patient made it malpractice.23
It is submitted that at least in a case where the person guilty of
malpractice fraudulently conceals the fact so as to prevent the injured
party from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute should not com-
mence to run until the injury is discovered or could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of diligence on the part of the injured
party.24  Some jurisdictions have so held.25  But in New York, the
bare fact that plaintiff was not advised of the extent of his injuries
or his right to a cause of action has been generally held to be im-
material.20
The decisions in the cases of Monahan v. Devinney 27 and Rud-
man v. Bancheri 28 bring to light another failing of our malpractice
statute. The defendants in the former case were unlicensed chiro-
practors who had undertaken to treat plaintiff for certain ailments.
As a result of unskilled acts on their part, plaintiff became paralyzed.
Defendants claimed Section 50 was a bar to the suit instituted against
them as action had not been commenced within the tvo-year period.
Plaintiff contended that the statute does not apply to unlicensed prac-
titioners. The court held that defendants were practicing medicine
as defined in Section 1250, subdivision 7, of the Education Law 29
accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff, or the person under whom he
claims, of the facts constituting the fraud."22 See case digested in PRASEKER, CASES AND MATEmALS ON NEw YoRE:
PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 42.
23 Benson v. Dean, 232 N. Y. 52, 133 N. E. 125 (1921).
24 See Notes (1931) 74 A. L. M. 1320.
251Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S. W. (2d) 503 (1934), where it
was held that defendant physician had a duty to exercise due care and, there-
fore, he could not be said as a matter of law not to have known of the negli-
gent treatment; the physician had a duty to disclose to the patient any injuries
inflicted by his carelessness, and failure to disclose was fraudulent concealment
which would toll the statute until the physician removed the foreign substance
from the patient's body, or, until the patient knew or should have learned of its
presence; Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S. E. 553 (1924); Graendal v.
Westrate, 171 Mich. 92, 137 N. W. 87 (1912).
28 Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653 (1929); Conklin v.
Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930); Tulloch v.
Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926).
27 131 Misc. 248, 225 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1927).
28 260 App. Div. 957, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 584 (2d Dep't 1940).
2 9 EDUCATION LAw § 1250, subd. 7. "The practice of medicine is defined
as follows: A person practices medicine within the meaning of this article,
except as hereinafter stated, who holds himself out as being able to diagnose,
19411
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and that the allegation of unskilful treatment with injurious results
indicated that the action was based on malpractice and therefore sub-
ject to the two-year limitation. In Rudman v. Bancheri it was de-
cided that the allegation in the complaint that defendant, a pharma-
cist although not qualified or licensed as a physician "failed to exer-
cise due care, caution, and prudence in the premises" with injurious
results, classified the action as one in malpractice, against which the
Statute of Limitations had run. It seems unreasonable that the stat-
ute should grant to irregular practitioners the same indulgence grant-
ed to duly licensed physicians and surgeons. In answer to this criti-
cism, judge Staley in the Monahan case said: "I think any consid-
eration of this kind is based upon a wrong assumption. I do not think
that the two year statute of limitations as to malpractice was adopted
for the purpose of granting an indulgence to duly licensed physicians
and surgeons simply because they are regular and legal practitioners,
but that the statute was passed because of the uncertainty of the
results attending the treatment of the disease in the first place and
the increasing difficulty of tracing such results as time goes on. Age,
inherited traits, latent diseases, debilitated conditions, sometimes ren-
der the most skilful treatment unavailing." 80
This line of reasoning, however, was apparently abandoned in
the case of Isenstein v. Malcomson.81 Plaintiff prosecuted an action
to recover for personal injuries resulting from negligence on the part
of a registered nurse. The question raised was whether the negli-
gence of the nurse in her professional employment might be consid-
ered as malpractice governable by the two-year period of limitation.82
It was held that the statute was not applicable to a nurse. If the
court had accepted the reasons for the enactment of Section 50 as
stated in the Monahan opinion a different conclusion would have been
reached.f3 Does not a nurse deserve the protection of a statute passed
"because of the uncertainty of the results attending the treatment of
the disease in the first place, and the increasing difficulty of tracing
such results as time goes on"? Judge Staley states in his opinion:
"in relation to the medical profession it (the term malpractice) has
been applied not only to duly licensed physicians and surgeons, but
to irregular practitioners as well, and also to nurses, midwives, and
apothecaries." 3 4 The only explanation for the Isenstein decision is
treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or
physical condition, and who shall either offer or undertake by any means or
method to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain,
injury, deformity or physical condition."
3o Monahan v. Devinney, 131 Misc. 248, 250, 225 N. Y. Supp. 601, 605
(1927).31 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N. Y. Supp. 641 (1st Dep't 1929).
32 See case digested in PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORK
PLEADING AND PaCTCE (2d ed. 1937) 43.
33 See Isenstein v. Malcomson, 133 Misc. 691, 234 N. Y. Supp. 52 (1929).
35 Monahan v. Devinney, 131 Misc. 248, 249, 225 N. Y. Supp. 601, 604
(1927).
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that the court must have believed Section 50 was passed as an in-
dulgence to a favored class, i.e., physicians and surgeons, and that
this class was not to be enlarged. In other words, only physicians
and surgeons and, if we accept the Monahan decision, those acting
in that capacity may be guilty of malpractice. This, however, is not
the case. The following are some of the recognized definitions of
malpractice:
(1) Negligent acts on the part of a physician or surgeon in treating a
patient, by means of which such patient suffers death or (unnecessary) injury.85
(2) Mistreatment of a disease or injury through ignorance, carelessness
or criminal intent.6
(3) Improper treatment through carelessness, or ignorance, or intention-
ally.87
It is noticeable that the two latter definitions do not confine the acts
to physicians and surgeons.
The Monahan and Isenstein cases are irreconcilable. The latter
case, which seems to emphasize the "favored class" theory, is in di-
rect conflict with Justice Staley's opinion. The law which they rep-
resent is, however, clear. Section 50 applies to illegal practitioners;
it is not applicable to a registered nurse.
Conclusion
A review of the cases discloses the fact that a literal application
of the Statute of Limitations for malpractice has led to many unjust
results. The fault does not lie so much with our courts as with the
legislature which enacted Section 50. It is for the legislature to pro-
vide the remedy. In the first place, the two-year limitation period
should not run from the date of perpetration of the malpractice but
from the date of discovery. The amended statute might wel be
modeled upon Section 48 which deals with fraud3 8 Section 48 pro-
vides that an action must be brought within six years from the time
the cause of action accrues. There follows, however, a clear state-
ment that the cause of action is deemed to accrue at the date of dis-
covery of the fraud. The reason for incorporating such a provision
in the case of fraud is equally applicable to actions for malpractice.
The courts in holding that the period of limitation runs from the
date of perpetration of the injury have often barred valid causes of
action rather than stale claims. It is unreasonable to expect that
plaintiff will in every case discover the presence of sponges, forceps
or tubing in his body within two years. It must be further recognized
35WITTHAs AND BEcKER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1894) 73, 76.
36 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIoNARY (8th ed. 1924) 589.
87 GouLD's MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1928) 757.
38 See note 9, supra.
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as a fact that the confidence necessarily reposed in a physician would
tend to lull the patient into a feeling of security and thereby to allow
what might have been a valid cause of action to become barred by
the passage of time.3" We have seen that a contract action provides
only a small measure of relief. The treatment theory as enunciated
in Gillette v. Tucker 40 and Sly v. Van Lengen is not founded so much
in sound reasoning as in an indirect attempt to get around Section 50.
Although it is reassuring to know that the courts realize the injus-
tices caused by the statute, the proper remedy, nevertheless, is not
with them but with the legislature that produced it.
The Monahan, Rudnan and Isenstein cases introduced another
source of criticism concerning the Statute of Limitations for mal-
practice. In justice to the Monahan opinion, it must be admitted
that the statute was undoubtedly passed because of the uncertainty
attending the treatment of any disease in the beginning and the diffi-
culty of tracing the results of such treatment as time goes on. But
this does not necessarily exclude a realization of the fact that Section
50 was adopted as an indulgence to a favored class. Generally speak-
ing, those who have shown their respect for our laws have always
constituted a "favored class" in the eyes of the legislature. In this
instance, that class consists of licensed practitioners. It has been the
avowed purpose of both the legislature and our courts to discourage
those who disobey the law. Extending the benefit of a short period
of limitation to illegal practitioners is hardly a means to this end.
On the other hand, a registered nurse should be granted this indul-
gence. In such case, the statute would still be serving its purpose as
expressed by Justice Staley, but it would be a source of protection
only to those who deserve the "blessing" of the law.
It is submitted that amendment of the Statute of Limitations
as to malpractice is the only solution to the problem. As long as
Section 50 continues to remain on the books in its present form, our
courts will be saddled with an unnecessarily ambiguous statute. An
amended statute, explicit in terms and leaving no room for doubt on
any point, would prevent further injustice. This section, perhaps
more than any other, merits the attention of the revisers of our Civil
Practice Act.
ROSE GRESS.
A CURRENT PROBLEM IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF RELIGION
Labor cases excepted, there is, perhaps, no more fruitful source
of the law governing inter-group relations than the litigation which
has resulted from attacks upon minority groups. Typical are the
39 (1923) 37 H.&iv. L. REV. 272.
40 See note 14, supra.
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